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ABSTRACT Blockchain technology has attracted tremendous attention in both academia and capital
market. However, overwhelming speculations on thousands of available cryptocurrencies and numerous
initial coin offering (ICO) scams have also brought notorious debates on this emerging technology. This
paper traces the development of blockchain systems to reveal the importance of decentralized applications
(dApps) and the future value of blockchain. We survey the state-of-the-art dApps and discuss the direction of
blockchain development to fulfill the desirable characteristics of dApps. The readers will gain an overview
of dApp research and get familiar with recent developments in the blockchain.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, Decentralized Application, Smart Contract, Software Systems, Survey
I. INTRODUCTION
By definition, a blockchain is a continuously growing chain
of blocks, each of which contains a cryptographic hash of the
previous block, a time-stamp, and its conveyed data [1]. Due
to the existence of the cryptographic hash, the data stored in
a blockchain are inherently resistant to modification: if one
block of data is modified, all blocks afterward should be re-
generated with new hash values. This feature of immutability
is fundamental to blockchain applications.
Maintenance of peer-to-peer (P2P) ledgers for cryptocur-
rencies has become the first killer application of blockchain.
Thousands of cryptographic tokens, or coins, were delivered
to the public market, after the huge leap in market cap of
Bitcoin [2]. However, due to the lack of legal regulation
and auditing, a large number of scams, so-called “air coins”,
also brought bad reputations to the blockchain technology.
Doubts on the value of cryptocurrencies have been raised.
Warren Buffett—the famous billionaire investor—insisted
that cryptocurrencies will come to a “bad ending”, and
claimed that Bitcoin is “probably rat poison squared”. Instead
of discussing cryptocurrencies, this paper surveys the state-
of-the-art of blockchain technology and introduces decen-
tralized applications (dApps), which is a novel form of the
blockchain-empowered software system.
In the rest of this article, we review the classic blockchain
systems in Section II and reveal the value of blockchain
systems in Section III. We survey the state-of-the-art dApps
in Section IV and envision the desirable characteristics of
future dApps in Section V. We also discuss the considerations
when selecting a blockchain implementation in Section VI.
Recent research to develop next-generation blockchain sys-
tems that address some of these characteristics is presented
in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the article.
II. BACKGROUND: CLASSIC BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS
In this section, we trace the evolution of decentralized ledgers
that led to classic blockchain systems adopting public con-
sensus models.
A. PREHISTORY
Researchers have been working on the implementation of
digital cash [3] since the 1980s. Before the advent of Bitcoin,
academia has established solid foundations in this topic. The
blockchain concept, the fundamental form of public ledger,
was first introduced for time-stamped digital documents in
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1991 [4]. Later, Merkle tree [5] was incorporated into the
cryptographically secured chain by allowing several docu-
ments to be collected into one block, which improves the
system efficiency and reliability [6]. However, such a ledger
implemented with a chain of blocks is still a centralized
database, which relies on the maintenance of a trusted third
party financial institute.
B. SYNCHRONIZATION ISSUE
Centralized systems are criticized for their vulnerability,
due to the single-point-of-failure (SPOF) issue. By contrast,
decentralized systems implemented in a distributed manner
suffer from the data synchronization issue, which is well
summarized as the Byzantine Generals’ Problem [7]. In other
words, the participants in the decentralized ledger system
need to achieve consensus, an agreement upon every message
being broadcast to each other. A common Byzantine fault
tolerance can be achieved if the “loyal generals”, the honest
peers in our context, have a majority agreement on their
decisions. Nevertheless, intruders may perform Sybil attack
[8] to control a substantial fraction of the public P2P system
by representing multiple identities, which may lead to a crit-
ical “Double Spending” issue in the blockchain-empowered
decentralized ledger.
C. DOUBLE SPENDING ISSUE
Thanks to the hash-linking feature of the blockchain, each
coin in the ledger can be traced back to the first record
when it was created. Therefore, forgery on a non-existing
coin is impossible in a public decentralized ledger. However,
different from a physical coin, a digital coin can be easily
replicated by duplicating the data. In this context, it is critical
to prevent the dishonest behavior of spending a coin more
than once. If a dishonest user of the public ledger is capable
of performing a Sybil attack, the coins that the user double-
spends will be legalized by the majority of parties, which
diminishes user trust as well as the circulation and retention
of the currency.
D. PROOF OF WORK CONSENSUS
Satoshi Nakamoto applied Proof-of-Work (PoW) [9] to solve
the double spending issue in the first white paper of Bitcoin
[2]. In this case, the PoW involves a mathematical calculation
to scan for a numeric value that when hashed, the hash
result begins with a specific number of zero bits. With PoW,
each peer in the P2P network needs to compete with each
other in solving the puzzles, which is also called mining.
The winner of each competition will have the privilege to
create a block and broadcast it to the peers. This PoW is
intrinsically a brute-force search procedure, while its answer
can be easily verified with a hashing process that requires
O(1) complexity. The PoW imposes an intentional computa-
tional cost that increases the difficulty of the identity forge in
Sybil attack to a very high level, due to the large hardware
investment required of a particular network participant. On
the other hand, the peers who successfully create some blocks
will receive coin rewards for their work. In fact, even if a
particular peer has a tremendous computational capacity, the
value of using this capacity to earn coin rewards is higher
than that of attacking the decentralized system. This type of
PoW consensus mechanism demotivates the intruders, and
thus protects the decentralized ledger.
E. BROADER DEFINITION OF BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS
As discussed above, the conventional definition of
“blockchain” goes beyond the technology of blockchain that
links data blocks into an immutable chain. It is applicable to a
completely distributed and decentralized system that requires
all participating peers to follow specific blockchain rules in
achieving data synchronization. In this article, we would like
to present a broader definition for blockchain systems, which
is a combination of the blockchain, P2P network, and the
consensus model.
FIGURE 1: Key Elements of Blockchain Systems
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of such a broadly de-
fined blockchain system. All participants in the P2P network
need to store blockchain data on their own while synchroniz-
ing all of their blocks with those stored by other peers based
on a consensus model. In fact, the consensus is represented
by the longest chain agreed upon by the majority of the peer
nodes.
III. EVOLUTION OF BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS
In this section, we discuss the evolution of different genera-
tions of blockchain systems in terms of their functions and
applications.
A. DECENTRALIZED LEDGER
Bitcoin [2] is representative of the classic blockchain system.
As the first decentralized ledger, it has attracted more than ten
thousand nodes to establish the largest market capitalization
among all cryptocurrencies. The most important contribution
of Bitcoin is that it solves the double spending issue to make
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digital asset unique and valuable1. In fact, the success of
Bitcoin opened the door of blockchain applications to the
public. However, Bitcoin itself is only a public decentralized
ledger without any subject matter, which is criticized by
many economists as another Ponzi scam. Along with the de-
velopment of the P2P network, the subject matter of Bitcoin
has now become the computational cost of nodes (miners),
which is mainly concerned with PoW efforts. However, these
efforts do not bring any value but only strengthen the ro-
bustness of the system. By convention, such application of
decentralized ledger is called blockchain 1.0.
B. DECENTRALIZED SMART CONTRACT
In order to add more values to the blockchain ecosystem,
Ethereum [10] is designed to be a platform to facilitate
decentralized smart contracts via Ether, its own currency
vehicle. Smart contract [11] refers to the idea that legal con-
tracts can be notarized and executed automatically. Equipped
with Solidity [12], a Turing-complete programming lan-
guage, Ethereum developers are able to implement a series of
smart contracts, which are executable programs written into
blocks. Due to the immutable nature, Ethereum extends the
application of blockchain from the data to the computation
domain. In other words, after the developers have compiled
and deployed their software to the public, nobody could
ever revise the logic of the program. Therefore, publishing
a smart contract creates a set of public trusted functional-
ity for public users. These smart contracts, when invoked,
will be executed by the distributed nodes in a decentralized
manner. Applications of smart contracts are currently still
in a preliminary stage. Most of the current applications are
limited to the possession and transfer of virtual assets, such
as stocks, bonds, game items, etc. For example, Initial Coin
Offerings (ICOs) on Ethereum have become a popular solu-
tion for fundraising by start-up companies. By convention,
Ethereum is considered the representative of blockchain 2.0
applications.
C. DECENTRALIZED APPLICATIONS
Nevertheless, current blockchain-based applications are still
limited to utilizing smart contract for core data and func-
tionality that should be resistant to modifications. The smart
contract users still need to run their programs locally in order
to complete the application. One of the key reasons is the
performance limitation of current blockchain technologies,
which cannot meet the requirements of many applications.
This leaves potential issues in operational security and appli-
cation maintenance. For example, there might be intentional
cheating behaviors in local pieces that are hidden from the
public audit.
To this end, the ultimate blockchain application should
be a dApp that is completely hosted by P2P blockchain
1More precisely, Bitcoin solves the double spending issue with high
probability under the assumption of honest majority. See, e.g., Section 11
in the Bitcoin whitepaper [2].
system. Ideally, a deployed dApp will need no maintenance
and governance from the original developers. In other words,
an ideal blockchain application or service should be operable
without any human intervention, which forms a Decentral-
ized Autonomous Organization (DAO) [13]. A DAO is an
organization that is run through rules encoded as smart con-
tracts running on the blockchain. Due to its autonomous and
automatic nature, a DAO’s cost and profit are shared by all
participants by simply recording all activities into the blocks.
In fact, Bitcoin, the most classic blockchain system, is an
example of a DAO. According to the definition of dApps in
[14], dApps are characterized by four properties as follow:
• Open Source: Due to the trusted nature of blockchain,
dApps need to make their codes open source, so that
audits from third parties become possible.
• Internal Cryptocurrency Support: Internal currency is
the vehicle that runs the ecosystem for a particular
dApp. With tokens, it is feasible for a dApp to quantify
all credits and transactions among participants of the
system, including content providers and consumers.
• Decentralized Consensus: The consensus among decen-
tralized nodes is the foundation of transparency.
• No Central Point of Failure: A fully decentralized sys-
tem should have no central point of failure since all com-
ponents of the applications will be hosted and executed
in the blockchain.
IV. STATE-OF-THE-ART DAPPS
Blockchain technology has been adopted in many industries.
As summarized in "State of The dApps" website2, Ethereum
has hosted different categories of dApps, including exchange,
energy, finance, health, identity, insurance, media, etc. How-
ever, many state-of-the-art dApps are in fact only partially
decentralized. For example, Blockstack3 and OpenBazaar4
are leveraging the blockchain to validate only identities of
users and not anything else. In this section, we present a
review of the existing dApps that are most popular.
A. GAMES
The video game industry perfectly fits the nature of cryp-
tocurrencies ecosystem since it fulfills the ultimate dream
of many game players: the items owned by their virtual
characters in the gaming world are non-fungible and can
be traded and inherited into a new game. To this end, the
blockchain-based game is a new emerging trend. Currently,
due to the limitations of transaction fee and delay, most
blockchain games are still in preliminary stage, focusing on
collectibles and trade of virtual assets. Even though this kind
of game is not much fun at all, it still has brought a huge
change in the game industry.
As one of the most successful blockchain games and even
a milestone in the development of Ethereum, CryptoKitties5
2https://www.stateofthedapps.com/rankings
3https://blockstack.org/
4https://www.openbazaar.org/
5https://www.cryptokitties.co/
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may be the most well-known blockchain game nowadays.
Due to its popularity, its transactions once brought down
the Ethereum network and put pressure on blockchain tech-
nology. In CryptoKitties, players can buy, sell, and breed
cats by using a smart contract on the Ethereum Blockchain.
Being different from previous collectible blockchain games
that can only buy and sell specific items, this game is unique
in differentiating each CryptoKitty in the game. Each cat is
different from others in its physical characteristics, traits, and
genes. A cat is bred by a couple and inherits facets from its
parents as a unique combination of the two. Players are incen-
tivized to breed cats with rare traits [15] [16]. Similar gaming
mechanisms have been applied to different virtual assets to
create many other blockchain games, such as Etheremon6,
CryptoCelebrities7, CryptoCountries8, Etherbots9, etc.
Another representative type of blockchain games is the
digital casino. The nature of cryptocurrency makes it ex-
tremely simple for these games to be developed and broad-
casted. For example, Etheroll10 enables players to bet on cer-
tain numbers for profit. Similar games include Vdice11, bit-
casino12, VegasCasino13, etc. Ponzi games14, e.g. Fomo3D15,
also falls into this category.
Apparently, blockchain based games benefit from the fea-
tures of non-fungible tokens and system transparency. It is
good news for game players that blockchain has become a
disrupting technology for the game industry. The relationship
between game players and game companies has been com-
pletely transformed by such a new concept. In this ecosystem,
the game players become parts of the game and create unique
contents in the game, and their behaviors in games can
unpredictably influence the development of the game. The
virtual world in games becomes a real Utopia [17].
However, games on blockchains are still in their pre-
liminary stage. First, the entertainment value of blockchain
games is still far behind traditional video games. As dis-
cussed above, most blockchain games still stay at the level
of exchanging collectibles no matter how the game designers
change their trade method. A game that only collects tokens
without any possibility for interaction is not able to attract
many game players. Second, many game players play the
games only for monetary purpose rather than for enjoyment.
Users are just buying tokens with some visual representation,
such as celebrity photos, stamps, and countries, hoping to
trade them for profit. Last, the lifetime of games is unpre-
dictable. In conventional gaming operation, parameters and
rules for in-game economy and battles would be dynamically
6https://www.etheremon.com/
7https://cryptocelebrities.co/
8https://cryptocountries.io/
9https://etherbots.io/
10https://etheroll.com/
11http://www.vdice.io/
12https://bitcasino.io/
13https://vegascasino.io/
14https://www.finder.com.au/a-brief-history-of-cryptocurrency-ponzi-
games-up-to-fomo3d
15https://exitscam.me/play
adjusted according to the progress of the game, in order to
achieve better balance. Nevertheless, in a fully decentralized
blockchain game, operators may lose control over the ecosys-
tem, which may lead to rapid loss of game populations.
Overall, while blockchain games have just been introduced
several months ago, they have already attracted a lot of atten-
tion. Many giant game companies and great game producers
have seen the potential of blockchain games and started to
develop blockchain-based games. We expect to see some
high-quality blockchain games in the near future.
B. USER-GENERATED CONTENT (UGC) NETWORK
User-generated content (UGC), also known as user-created
content (UCC), is used to describe any form of content,
such as video, blogs, discussion post, that is created and
published by a user for consumption by other users. In a
UGC application, users and their contents are the core value
of the system. Popular UGC applications include Reddit16,
9GAG17, Flickr18, and Wikipedia19. Existing UGC appli-
cations have critical issues regarding security and privacy.
First, the original content from some small creator is easily
stolen by other popular pages. Second, these giant social
media platforms are privy to collect users’ information and
sell their private information to advertisers so that they can
target users for advertisement. Blockchains are able to solve
these problems due to their decentralized nature. Below we
describe three prominent blockchain-based UGC platforms.
1) Steem
Steem20 is a blockchain-based platform with cryptocurrency
rewards to publishers. Steem also has its own cryptocur-
rency, called STEEM. STEEM is available for purchase
and exchange for various cryptocurrencies [18]. Steem has
proposed an idea of mining by human intelligence. People
can convert their original creations, such as articles, music,
and other forms of creation to money in this platform and no
transaction fee is charged by a third party.
2) Gems
According to the white paper, Gems21 is a decentral-
ized human task crowd-sourcing protocol on the Ethereum
blockchain. Similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)22,
Gems is a marketplace where requesters publish their micro
tasks and deploy workers to finish the tasks by paying the
workers. However, MTurk, as a middleman, charges a large
amount of money as transaction fees. In addition, as the
accuracy of results from workers is variable, the requesters
have to repetitively pay for the same tasks to reach a con-
sensus. Gems is designed to solve the above problems. The
16https://www.reddit.com/
17https://9gag.com/
18https://www.flickr.com/
19https://www.wikipedia.org/
20https://steem.io/
21https://gem.co/
22https://www.mturk.com/
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Gems Protocol includes a staking mechanism to ensure task
completion, a Gems Trust Score to value workers’ integrity,
and a payment system to reduce transaction fees [19].
3) ONO
The goal of ONO23 is to establish a decentralized social
network based on the principles of freedom, equality, and
social public governance, in which the value of attention
is properly defined and the content creators can fully reap
the true rewards of the value they create. According to their
white paper, the ONO platform will share the profit of social
networking with the content creators.
C. INTERNET OF THINGS
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the connection of billions
of physical devices equipped with sensors and/or actuators to
the Internet for collecting and sharing data and controlling
our environment. The data can be collected and fused for
communications without any human involvement, in order
to bridge the digital and physical worlds [20]. Blockchain-
based IoT solutions are well suited for simplifying business
processes, improving customer experience and achieving sig-
nificant cost efficiency [21]. According to a previous study
[22], blockchain offers good potential for IoT solutions,
because IoT applications are by definition distributed. More-
over, blockchain is designed as a basis for applications that
involve transactions and interactions.
1) Smart Hardware
Automation is a key concept in IoT applications. Smart hard-
ware that connects to the network should be able to perform
predefined actions without human intervention. This require-
ment perfectly fits the nature of smart contracts running
on blockchains. With the transparent and immutable smart
contracts, multiple parties in an IoT platform can establish
trustful relationships without complicated conversations and
regulations. For example, a guest checking into a future hotel
may not need to register at the front desk, but instead pay
for the room through a smart contract, which then instructs
the door and all smart appliance in the specific room to
accommodate the customer. On the other hand, the customer
who has run out of funds will not be able to access the room
or the facilities in it.
2) Supply Chain
IoT is bringing tremendous impact to supply chains. In
the blockchain era, the integration of smart contracts with
supply chains will further optimize the systems. Supply chain
management involves multiple stakeholders and consider-
able complexity. Multiple levels of suppliers, manufacturers,
service providers, distributors, and retailers make record-
keeping and communications inefficient. IoT and smart con-
tracts can simplify the whole procedure by coordinating sen-
sory data, documentation, and transparency to regulations.
23https://www.ono.chat/en/
For example, a delay in the shipment of some raw material
can be detected by the IoT network and its contingent plan
specified in a transparent smart contract can be automatically
executed to place make-up orders, so that the impact on
the manufacturing process can be minimized. In this case,
numerous emails and telephone communications are replaced
by a commonly agreed smart contract, which can save a huge
amount of time and resources.
3) Source Tracing
Nowadays, governments and consumers are increasingly de-
manding transparency regarding the sources of the goods
that reach the marketplace. However, such transparency is
difficult to achieve due to the large number of parties in-
volved in the manufacturing, transportation and distribution
of the goods and the diverse documentation and tracking sys-
tems that may exist between the sources and the consumer.
Blockchains can fill the gap in enabling source tracing for
items due to the fact that a blockchain can store an immutable
transactions history on the chain, making it easy to recreate
the history and identify the origin of a product. According to
[23], even though a centralized system can achieve the same
result in a fast speed, in many cases, it is hard to identify
the source if e.g., the food purchased by a consumer get
contaminated, since a trusted central agency usually does not
exist, and even if one exists, there is a lack of transparent data
storage in the central agency. Moreover, diverse information
systems used by different parties have no motivation to be
interoperable, i.e., people do not have the motivations or easy
means to provide data directly to a central agency even if one
exists.
D. SHARING ECONOMY CREDITS
A sharing economy requires a credit system to encourage
contributions from system participants and maintain fairness
among them. However, traditional credits issued from a cen-
tralized commercial organization may not be considered a
real incentive, since the value of the credit may be dictated
by the organization, while the participants may need to with-
draw and utilized these credits somewhere or for something
else. This section discusses the possibility of leveraging
blockchain for such an ecosystem.
1) File Sharing Credits
The possibility of file sharing has been investigated since
the explosive adoption of the BitTorrent P2P network [24].
Recently, the Interplanetary Files System (IPFS)24, a decen-
tralized P2P distributed file system, has emerged with the
objective to connect computers with the same file system
and to distribute large datasets. IPFS can access files in any
network by the file addresses, each of which is stored as a
byte string. To better facilitate IPFS with credit incentives,
filecoin25 is a token protocol whose blockchain runs on a
24https://ipfs.io/
25https://filecoin.io/
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novel consensus model, called Proof-of-Spacetime, where
blocks are created by miners that store the data. The filecoin
protocol provides a data storage and retrieval service via a
network of independent storage providers that do not rely
on a single coordinator, such that: 1) clients pay to store
and retrieve data, 2) storage miners earn tokens by offering
storage, 3) retrieval miners earn tokens by serving data.
The filecoins can be exchanged for US dollars, Bitcoins,
Ethereum, and more. In short, filecoin creates a decentralized
storage network (DSN) and a cryptocurrency marketplace on
top of it.
2) Data Sharing Credits
Similar sharing concept has been introduced into
data/bandwidth sharing scenarios. RightMesh [25] claims
to be the world’s first software-based, ad-hoc mobile mesh
network that brings connectivity to all. The connectivity is
in P2P mode via Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi Direct. When
a client and hotspot node find each other, they form a new
mesh for people to join and share, and it grows from there.
Redundancy can strengthen the mesh network. In a densely-
populated region, more available people and nodes can join
the mesh network, which strengthens the robustness of the
network. To encourage participation, a mesh node provider
is awarded RMESH Tokens and the payment process is
decentralized by leveraging the Ethereum platform [26].
3) Computational Sharing Credits
At present, there is a growing need for computational power
for scientific research, machine learning and graphics ren-
dering in large ecosystems. This area has evolved from
projects like BOINC [27], which relied on the goodwill of
users to solve problems like DNA folding with their spare
CPU cycles [28]. Some algorithms, such as machine learning
and deep learning algorithms, and other sophisticated so-
lutions are raising demands for high-performance hardware
and more bandwidth to address the needs of enterprises
and businesses in minutes [29]. To solve this problem, the
idea of building a platform that enables participants to lend
and borrow computing powers emerged. Golem26 is a P2P
platform that allows the participants to rent and buy com-
puting powers directly by using cryptocurrency. In Golem,
a distributed network of computers that are managed by
blockchain and smart contracts is used to create an ecosystem
where the computing power can be borrowed. Hong et al.
in [30] proposed a connectivity-aware mobile computational
resource sharing system in D2D networks. By incorporating
a blockchain-empowered credit system, user selfishness in
this D2D computational sharing system is effectively and
significantly reduced [31].
V. DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF DAPPS
According to the application scenarios discussed above, fu-
ture dApps demand a blockchain platform that fulfills the
26https://golem.network/
following desirable characteristics:
A. BETTER PERFORMANCE
1) Low Latency
Long transaction delay has been a critical issue since the
birth of Bitcoin. Since the average time for the Bitcoin
nodes to mine a block is 10 minutes, the average transaction
confirmation time is around an hour (as a user typically waits
for 6 blocks). Even though the response latency has been
significantly reduced to around 15 seconds in Ethereum, a
sufficiently small latency to support interactions of general
applications is yet to be achieved. In fact, longer delays
frustrate users and make dApps less competitive with existing
non-blockchain alternatives. For instance, a common user
in a blockchain-based social network website will typically
require the system to respond to his/her like or share action
to a post within 2 to 3 seconds.
2) High Throughput
Modern web-based systems, e.g., social networks, massive
multi-player online games, online shopping malls, require
the blockchain platform to support millions of active users
on a daily basis. Therefore, the capability of handling a
large amount of concurrent traffic is critical in a dApp
platform. However, current blockchain platforms still suffer
from throughput bottlenecks. For example, CryptoKitties,
which gained a lot of popularity on its launch, at one point
account for nearly 30% of all transactions on Ethereum,
which resulted in a peak backlog of about 30,000 pending
transactions.
3) Fast Sequential Performance
In system designs, dependencies among software compo-
nents or logical steps restrict the execution of an appli-
cation. Some procedures in certain applications, such as
updates on one particular piece of data, cannot be imple-
mented in parallel, due to the sequential dependent on the
results produced by previous steps. In blockchain systems,
the sequential performance of a dApp is determined by the
response delays from all nodes in the network, since all
transactions/operations should be executed and verified by
all nodes to reach a consensus. Therefore, the blockchain
platform that hosts dApps needs fast sequential performance
to handle high volumes.
B. ENABLING OFFLINE TRANSACTIONS
Many current blockchain systems depend on Internet connec-
tivity in order to verify funds quickly. Systems participating
in a particular blockchain network may go offline periodi-
cally. However, if a subset of devices disconnect from the
Internet and exchange signed transactions with each other,
there is no guarantee that double spending has not occurred
if another device remaining online with the same key-pair
as an offline device has the ability to simultaneously spend.
For example, consider a group of people take a bus trip to a
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Wei Cai et al.: Decentralized Applications: The Blockchain-Empowered Software System
remote village with their mobile phones. The village has no
Internet access. A dApp could be designed such that it could
accept offline transactions which are signed for payment for
goods. A person on the bus could send their payment for a
coconut this way to a vendor using a local Bluetooth connec-
tion. When this signature eventually is relayed to the Internet
at a later time, the payment would be successful, unless the
person on the bus also had the same key-pair being used back
in their home computer, and spent the money before they
went offline. This problem becomes more complicated when
large groups of devices fragment the network. Since many of
the blockchains rely on over 51% of devices to co-operate,
there are potential malicious attacks possible whereby an
attacker could attack the Internet infrastructure strategically
in order to divide and conquer with 51% attacks [32] [33].
C. REASONABLE MONETARY COST
1) Low Transaction Fee
As part of the incentives for block producers, the concept of
transaction fee was born with Bitcoin. In classic blockchain
systems, e.g., Ethereum, transaction fees can also be a way
to prevent spams or malicious executions of smart con-
tracts, since intruders need to spend their tokens to start
their attacks. However, transaction fees become a barrier for
transactions with relatively small monetary values, due to the
large proportion of the transaction overheads. In the current
blockchain ecosystem, the dApp developers are struggling
with the high transaction fees they need to pay when they
deploy and execute their smart contracts.
2) Modern Free Internet Business Model
Another critical issue related to transaction fees is the busi-
ness model. By default, the action initiator, e.g., the invoker
of the smart contract in Ethereum, need to purchase tokens
before they can utilize the system. This limits the user base
of the dApp, especially since cryptocurrency has yet to
achieve universal acceptance in society. In fact, the modern
Internet business model is based on the fast increase of user
popularity, which implies that the dApp developers should
have the flexibility to offer users free services. In other
words, the users do not need to purchase or hold tokens to
use the platform, which leads to more widespread adoption.
Future dApp can adopt the modern Internet business model
by offering free services to users and share the profit of the
platform with its users and its content producers.
D. FLEXIBLE MAINTAINABILITY
1) Enabling System Upgrades
As blockchain technologies are still in their infancy, it is
inevitable that a blockchain system will require upgrades
from one version to the next. However, due to the nature of
P2P consensus, the hard fork is the only approach for current
blockchain systems to upgrade themselves, which may result
in the loss of participating network nodes. Another potential
issue for a hard fork is that there will be multiple similar to-
kens sharing a common origin, which will confuse users. For
example, like Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash, ’Ethereum’ (ETH)
and ’Ethereum Classic’ (ETC) forked from each other in July
2016. To this end, a system upgrade mechanism is needed for
next-generation blockchain systems, which facilitate version
control of dApps deployed over them.
2) Easy Bug Recovery
Security issues in smart contracts has been investigated in
many previous works [34] [35] [36]. Though most bugs and
system flaws can be prevented by careful implementation
and intensive tests, it is virtually impossible to guarantee
that a non-trivial smart contract is bug-free. The situation is
exacerbated by the high complexity of some dApps. How-
ever, the immutable nature of blockchain data prevents the
modification of dApps, which makes the delivery of bug
patch impossible. Therefore, the blockchain platform must
provide flexibility in supporting bug recovery approaches for
dApp developers, especially for those critical issues that may
crush the whole ecosystem in dApps.
E. SIMPLER IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
Many blockchain dApp systems are struggling with chal-
lenges around identity. Some systems such as ZCash27 and
Monero28 try to hide the identity of users and transactions.
There has also been recent work to add the ability for
anonymity on top of existing blockchains, particularly in
use-cases like Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), where money
is being fund-raised through smart contracts and regulatory
bodies require the Know Your Customer (KYC) and the Anti
Money Laundering (AML) checks [37] without giving up the
identity of the contributors to the entire global network. On
the other hand, there is a movement to create one common
identity such as Blockstack29 that can be used across all
dApps in a similar way that openID30 was used to create a
common identity across web services.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN SELECTING A
BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATION
Different blockchain implementations with subtle differences
in key technical areas are constantly emerging to address
different shortcomings in existing systems. When selecting
a potential blockchain technology, one may wish to have an
implementation that is stable but may be willing to be flexible
when necessary. This can be measured by looking at how
often the network has "hard-forked" and how many derivative
projects (forks on GitHub) exist. It is also desirable that
the potential project has an active community of developers
(internal and external) - which may be measured by metrics
such as contributors, code commits and branches. Depending
on the dApp, one may look for a blockchain technology that
supports smart contracts and some form of scalable payments
such as payment channels, as well as the economic model
27https://z.cash/
28https://getmonero.org/
29https://blockstack.org/
30https://openid.net/
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of the dApps being built on top, and has support for the
correct programming languages for the project. To illustrate
some of these considerations, the Bitcoin project and the
Ethereum project are compared, however, any other project
could be subjected to a similar comparison and analysis when
selecting an appropriate technology for implementation.
1) Bitcoin
Bitcoin core’s GitHub31 lists 571 contributors and more than
18000 commits. There are many client implementations and
APIs in a variety of languages with varying maturity. For
instance, there is a Java library via the bitcoinj32 project (and
likely many others). The bitcoinj project has 95 contributors
and more than 3000 commits. According to bitnodes33, there
are about 10000 full nodes running Bitcoin (these are nodes
running full verification of the entire blockchain transaction
by transaction, as opposed to a thin client which relies on
a full node which is trusted to do this on its behalf). As of
March of 2017, there were more than 10000 Bitcoin projects
on GitHub34. Bitcoin has been running since January 2009.
According to GitHub, the Bitcoin source has been forked al-
most 20000 times, although the number of functioning forks
that are active is likely much lower. The handling of actual
forks as well as the market confusion and manipulations
created after these forks make it difficult to select newly
forked projects. According to blockchain info35, the highest
7-day average transactions per 24 hours seems to be about
425000, or 4.92 transactions per second (TPS). However,
some studies have shown that it may be able to reach 7
TPS (with the 1MB block size) [38]. The highest average
transaction fee according to BitInfoCharts36 was around USD
$55. With such a low transaction rate and high transaction
fee, it is clearly not feasible to create transactions at a very
granular rate for dApps (which severely restricts the type
of applications that are possible without a scalable payment
solution).
2) Ethereum
The Ethereum project has a few key GitHub repositories.
As of August 2018, the go-ethereum repository37 has 318
contributors, the cpp-ethereum repository38 has 136 contrib-
utors, ethereum-j39 has 69 contributors (and 5012 commits).
Solidity40, which is one of the smart-contract languages in
Ethereum, has 263 contributors. In total across these reposi-
tories, there are about 60000 commits. It’s likely that some
of the contributors overlap from the different parts of the
31https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin
32https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj
33https://bitnodes.earn.com/
34https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-projects-github-surpass-10000/
35https://www.blockchain.com/charts/n-transactions
36https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-transactionfees.html
37https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum
38https://github.com/ethereum/cpp-ethereum
39https://github.com/ethereum/ethereumj
40https://github.com/ethereum/solidity
project, but it is safe to say that Ethereum is at least compara-
ble to Bitcoin in terms of the number of developers working
on the project. According to ethernodes41 there are 16000
full nodes running Ethereum. Due to the way Ethereum is
organized into different projects, it is difficult to get one
number for the number of forks (like contributors). For in-
stance, go-ethereum has 6800 forks, cpp-ethereum has 2000,
and ethereumj has 890. Ethereum has been active since July
30th, 2015. According to etherscan42, the highest number
of transactions per 24-hour period was 1,349,890 or 15.62
transactions/second (almost four times more than Bitcoin or
twice as much as the 7 transactions/second Bitcoin should
be able to reach). Rouhani and Deters showed that Ethereum
transaction speed depends on which client implementation
is used, with the parity client performing significantly better
than the geth client [39]. The highest average transaction
fee according to BitInfoCharts43 was around USD $4.15.
Again there are similar concerns with respect to Bitcoin in
regard to being able to execute transactions at fine granularity
without overwhelming the network transactions throughput
and paying more to settle transactions compared to the value
of the data being sent.
3) Other Blockchains
In general, there are many forks of these two projects to
choose from, and many other new takes on blockchains.
Many of these projects have not yet undergone the scrutiny
that the main chains like Ethereum and Bitcoin have under-
gone. There are very few analyses by independent parties
that examine things like the theoretical limits of transac-
tions throughput, in-depth security audits, economics and
business models, and a multitude of other concerns. Many
have underdeveloped communities which may not persist,
with unclear roadmaps. Developers of dApps should consider
both technical suitability as well as the long-term stability
of the projects before choosing a particular technology for
the development. Presently, this type of analysis must be
done by the dApp developers, but there is incredible potential
for the research community to critically evaluate the options
available, to highlight best practices, what to avoid, how to
improve, and how to achieve scalability and sustainability.
VII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BLOCKCHAIN
SYSTEMS
In order to support above desirable characteristics of dApps,
both academia and industry have spent tremendous resources
and efforts in developing next-generation blockchain sys-
tems. In this section, we will summarize state-of-art research
directions in this area.
A. PAYMENT CHANNELS AND PAYMENT NETWORKS
Cryptocurrencies on blockchains work by recording every
transaction on blockchains. It has many unique features like
41https://www.ethernodes.org/network/1
42https://etherscan.io/chart/tx
43https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/ethereum-transactionfees.html
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decentralization, transaction transparency and so on, but it
has severe problems in terms of scalability. When there is a
burst of transactions, it takes too long to write all backlogged
transactions into a blockchain, especially for the blockchain
built atop PoW. In PoW, creating every single block needs
huge computing power. In order to reduce the number of
transactions that hit the blockchain, the concept of payment
channel is proposed. A payment channel is designed to
facilitate the payment between two parties, which allows
users to make multiple payments without triggering multiple
transactions. In general, a payment channel can be either uni-
directional or bidirectional. In this part, we will first introduce
the unidirectional payment channel and then introduce the
bidirectional one. After that, we will briefly introduce the
payment network.
1) Unidirectional Payment Channels
For the ease of presentation, we assume that user A needs
to pay some cryptocurrency to user B multiple times over
a period of time. The trivial solution to handle multiple
payments from A to B is that whenever A wants to pay B,
A first signs a transaction with the payment amount and then
broadcasts the signed transaction to the P2P network. The
transaction will be recorded and confirmed. In other words,
if user A pays user B say n times in a period of time, n
transactions will be generated by A and mined by miners. If
users A and B do not interact with other users44, people need
only be informed about the final balances of A and B once.
The payment channel is proposed by following the above
logic. In particular, a payment channel is like a joint banking
account where the cryptocurrency inside can be split and
transferred into two wallets. In the context of unidirectional
payment channel, sinceA paysB only, it is the responsibility
of A to create the payment channel and lock some deposit in
it as shown by Step 1 in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: The Life Cycle Unidirectional Payment Channel
Whenever A would like to pay B, rather than creating a
44This assumption is not necessary for practical payment channel imple-
mentation, which will be discussed later.
transaction and broadcasting it to the P2P network, A can
sign a signature splitting the cryptocurrency in the payment
channel and send B the signature, as shown in Step 2 of
Figure 2. Note that, whenB receives the signature,B has not
received the cryptocurrency yet. It is because the signature
is not broadcast on the P2P network and the cryptocurrency
in the ledger is not split yet. However, B could get paid
whenever he/she would like to by sending the signature to
the blockchain. At this time, we say the payment channel is
closed, as shown in Figure 2 at Step 3.
The advantage of using payment channels is that, since
A may pay B multiple times, B can just wait for another
signature from A. In the unidirectional payment channel, the
latterly signed signature from A is always more preferable
by B, so B can wait until A sign the nth signature and
broadcast the latest signature to the blockchain. Meanwhile,
since the deposit is already transferred out from A’s wallet
and locked into the payment channel, which will not be split
until the channel is closed, A and B can still interact with
other users and no conflict will occur. In summary, A and B
have just two transactions on the blockchain: the transaction
of A creating the ledger and putting a deposit in it, and the
transaction of B broadcasting the final signature. However,
A can actually pay B as many times as he/she wants to.
We want to highlight that the easiest way to implement the
unidirectional payment channel is only allowing B to close
the payment channel since B is the unidirectional receiver
who does not have the incentive to lie. When B closes the
payment channel by broadcasting the latest signature from
A, the remaining amount of cryptocurrency in the payment
channel not used by A will be reimbursed to A’s wallet.
To also enable user A, a.k.a. the payer, to close the pay-
ment channel, we need to associate every signature of A
with a time-stamp and introduce the “challenging period” to
the mechanism. When A broadcasts his/her own signature
into the blockchain, the time-stamp of the signature will be
logged and the payment will not be closed immediately but
going into the challenging period. If user B had received
A’s signature with a newer time-stamp, he can broadcast the
newer signature and the previous one will be overwritten. The
overwriting process can repeat between A and B until the
end of the challenging period. Eventually, the cryptocurrency
in the payment channel will be split with the last signature
broadcast in the P2P network.
2) Bidirectional Payment Channels
After the unidirectional payment channel has been intro-
duced, it will not be difficult to understand the bidirectional
payment channel. As the name indicates, if there is a bidi-
rectional payment channel between users A and B, each of
them can pay the other by signing a signature and sending
the signature to the other party. The prerequisite of using a
bidirectional payment channel between users A and B is that
both of them need to contribute to the deposit. For example,
let us assume A and B have contributed 5 dollars each in the
payment channel, so there are 10 dollars in the bidirectional
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payment channel. When A wants to pay B 2 dollars, A needs
to sign a signature of splitting the 10 dollars. In our case, the
splitting plan signed byA is 7 dollars going toB’s wallet and
A having the remaining 3 dollars. When B needs to pay A 1
dollar, B can create another signature that 4 and 6 dollars
are going to A and B’s wallets, respectively. Furthermore,
the deposit that a user contributed to the payment channel
is the maximum payment that he/she can pay its opponent.
Moreover, it is an intrinsic requirement that either user of the
payment channel can close the channel when he/she wants
to. However, people may not tell the truth. Reviewing the
example given above carefully we can find that user B can
still close the bidirectional payment channel by broadcasting
the signature signed by A in the first round, so it seems like
B could get 7 instead of 6 dollars if he/she is a liar!
In order to deal with this situation, let us recall what we
have done with the unidirectional payment channel when we
allow both users to close the payment channel. We introduced
the time-stamp and challenging period. So, if one of the users,
say A, finds that user B tried to close the payment channel
dishonestly (as the payment channel has entered the challeng-
ing period and the existing split plan reported by B is unfair
to A), then A can broadcast the signature signed by B. As
the B’s signature has a later time-stamp than A’s signature,
the splitting plan of cryptocurrency in payment channel will
be updated. Similar to the unidirectional payment channel
when allowing both users to close the channel, the splitting
plan is locked after the challenging period and either of them
can finally close the payment channel and the cryptocurrency
flows to each one’s wallet.
3) Payment Networks
To better understand payment networks, we can draw an
analogy between payment networks and communication net-
works. The link layer in a communication network is very
similar to the payment channel in a payment network, while
the end-to-end communication in a communication network
is just like the multiple hop payment in a payment network.
The reason why we want to use a payment network is
that creating a payment channel, no matter whether it is
unidirectional or bidirectional, still requires updating on the
blockchain. If there is another user that has set up payment
channels to other users, this user can relay the payment. For
example, if there are two payment channels such that one is
between users A and B and the other is between users B and
C. When A wants to pay C, say 2 dollars, he can simply pay
user B and let B pay user C. The problem is that B or C
can lie. For example, after B receives the payment from A,
B may refuse to pay C. Or, C may say that he did not receive
any payment from B even though he did.
The basic principle to solve the problem is letting A first
create a puzzle and send the key of the puzzle to C. The
puzzle is very difficult to solve, but it is very easy to validate
the key, like the hash operation. Then, A gives B the puzzle
and reach an agreement with B as follows: “if C offers you
(i.e. user B) the correct key, send C 2 dollars and I (i.e. user
A) will reimburse you (i.e. user B) 2 dollars when you (i.e.
user B) tell me what the correct answer is.”
4) Limitations of Payment Channels
Would payment channels be the ultimate solution? The an-
swer is not for all dApp scenarios. As discussed in Section
V-A3, sequential dependencies on the data resulting from
previous steps are essential requirements for many software
implementations. The off-chain data caching nature of pay-
ment channels will prevent the data from being synchronized
by all components of the system. Therefore, payment chan-
nels are not yet perfect in supporting next-generation dApps.
B. NOVEL CONSENSUS MODELS
Though the creative application of PoW consensus model
started the new era for blockchain, it is also criticized for
its energy inefficiency nature: all participating nodes in the
PoW network are doing useless mathematical work for the
privilege of writing blocks, which costs a tremendous amount
of electricity. For example, the annual energy consumption
index for Bitcoin mining alone is 11.8% more than that of
Switzerland, and ∼30% that of Australia with a landmass
of more than 7 million square kilometres45. Also, note that
this energy consumption is still growing fast for Bitcoin at a
rate of >500% from May 2017 to May 2018. In fact, recent
research [40] predicts that Bitcoin transactions may consume
as much electricity as Denmark by 2020. Moreover, adopting
PoW is also the intrinsic reason for high transaction fee and
long latency. Therefore, investigating an efficient consensus
model for future blockchain systems has been a hot topic in
both academia and industry. In this section, we review some
recent novel consensus models.
1) Proof of Stake (PoS)
As we revealed in Section II-D, PoW leverages hardware
investment to prevent identity forges in Sybil attacks. In con-
trast, the PoS consensus model46 tries to find an alternative
solution to this problem. Different from PoW, the network
participants need not solve mathematical problems in order
to write a block. Instead, the producer of a block is randomly
chosen based on the participant’s ownership of stake (i.e., the
more stake a participant has, the more likely it can become
a block producer). Under this circumstance, the amount of
tokens one node holds becomes the barrier of the identity
forge. In other words, the system intruders will need to
hold a majority of the coins in circulation to perform 51%
attack. In fact, this is extremely difficult: due to the laws
of supply and demand, the price of tokens in a system will
continuously increase when the intruders start their purchase,
which may punish them economically. More interestingly,
once the intruders become the major stakeholders of a digital
currency, they lose their motivation to attack: their attack
45https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption
46https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/what-proof-of-stake-is-and-why-
it-matters-1377531463/
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TABLE 1: Comparison among Different Consensus Models
PoW PoS DPoS
Metaphor City State Democratic System Capitalism System Parliamentary System
Mechanism One CPU One Vote One Token One Vote Vote for Delegates
Block
Rewards
To Miners Solved PoW To Token Holders as Interest To Elected Supernode Producing
Blocks
will disrupt the operation of the currency, which in turn
introduces financial damage to the intruders. From another
perspective, the PoS is similar to PoW in terms of creating
block producing barrier. The only difference is that PoS
encourages network participants to invest their money on
tokens, rather than mining machines. So does PoS solve the
tremendous overhead introduced by mathematical problem-
solving in PoW while preventing Sybil attacks? The answer
is affirmative. However, it does not mean that PoS is the per-
fect consensus model. One critical issue in PoS is the rational
forks by the stakeholders. As we discussed, PoS utilizes stake
to replace the PoW computation. However, once a block
producer in a PoS blockchain creates a fork, there is no cost
for all stakeholders to follow the sub-chain spontaneously.
Technically, one fork will double the stakeholders’ tokens
and two forks will triple them. There is nothing to lose for the
stakeholders to follow all chains and receive multiple coins
in different sub chains. Too many forks on one blockchain
will introduce chaos and confusions, thereby reducing the
value of the network. Due to these considerations, only a few
cryptocurrencies available in the market are based on PoS,
such as Peercoin47 and ShadowCash48.
2) Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS)
The DPoS consensus model, as explained in “DPOS Con-
sensus Algorithm - The Missing White Paper” for STEEM49,
solves the identity forge problem from another aspect: net-
work participants delegate their rights of producing blocks
to a small group of supernodes. The way that DPoS creates
barriers for identity forge in Sybil attack is the difficulty of
becoming a supernode. In a typical DPoS consensus, the
stakeholders need to vote for their preferred block producer
candidates, and those successfully elected receive rewards
from creating correct and timely blocks. With DPoS, the
computational overhead for PoW is eliminated since the
block producers do not have to compete with each other
in mathematical computations. Also, the stakeholders can-
not perform rational forks, since the votes allocated to the
stakeholders are limited in quantity, e.g. proportional to the
number of tokens they hold. On the other hand, the elected
block producers are supervised by the majority of stakehold-
ers to perform their duties for the incentives generated by
47https://peercoin.net/
48https://github.com/shadowproject/shadow
49https://steemit.com/dpos/@dantheman/dpos-consensus-algorithm-this-
missing-white-paper
creating new blocks. Any malicious behaviors from block
producers will be reported and unqualified block producers
will be voted out as a consequence. The number of block pro-
ducers is subject to different implementations. For example,
EOS50 has 21 supernodes while Asch51 has 101 delegates.
Block producers may also serve as governance gateway. Any
proposed change on system parameters, such as transaction
fee, block size, witness pay or block intervals, needs to be
approved by a majority of block producers. Since there is
only a limited number of block producers in DPoS, and the
voting procedure can readily screen out low-quality candi-
dates, it is easier for the system to optimize itself in terms
of performance. Accordingly, DPoS features relatively low
latency, high efficiency, and flexibility. However, there are
doubts around the mechanism of delegated block producers:
opponents criticize that DPoS is not a decentralized platform
since it is impossible to guarantee the purity of block pro-
ducers. The small group of block producers may conspire to
maximize their own interests. Also, since the block producers
will receive rewards, a group of candidates who did not get
elected may create forks on the main chain, which results
in multiple chains as well. In summary, DPoS proposes to
leverage the power of stakeholder approval voting to resolve
consensus issues in a fair and democratic way.
3) Comparison Among Consensus Models
Table 1 provides a comparison among different consensus
models. We would like to utilize three political models as the
metaphor for PoW, PoS, and DPoS. As the first generation
blockchain system, PoW is the original P2P consensus model
for blockchains, which is analogous to democratic voting in
ancient European city-states. Its “One CPU One Vote” idea is
exactly the same to the “One Man One Vote” form. However,
once the size of the system increases to a certain level, this
form of democracy becomes inefficient. On the other hand,
PoS borrows the idea of interest produced by cash savings,
so that newly generated tokens are distributed to those stake-
holders in proportion to their current holdings. More tokens
indicate more benefits in the system, which is a feature of the
capitalist systems: the means of production derives a passive
income from their operation. In contrary, DPoS borrows from
the political model of parliamentary systems adopted by
many countries: representatives are elected by the public to
50https://www.eos.io/
51http://www.asch.so/
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efficiently solve the legal and social issues. Most blockchain
systems allow a certain amount of inflation for the circulating
tokens. A common practice is to generate new coins as
block rewards for block producers, which encourages the
participants of the system. Due to their unique properties,
different consensus mechanisms should be associated with
different reward models, as listed in Table 1.
There is still significant ongoing research on creating novel
consensus models. Recent proposals include Leased Proof
of Stake52, Proof of Burn53, Proof of Capacity54, Proof of
Elapsed Time55, Algorand56, etc. However, these protocols
have yet to achieve wide acceptance by the dApps commu-
nity.
C. BEYOND PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS
Public blockchains are also referred to as permissionless
blockchains as system participants do not need any permis-
sion before joining the network. In some application scenar-
ios where transaction frequency or data privacy is critical,
e.g., certain decentralized high update rate enterprise record-
keeping applications or storage of medical records, permis-
sionless blockchains are challenged by their low efficiency
and highly open nature.
First, most permissionless blockchains have significant
bottlenecks on efficiency (typically in terms of TPS) where
the necessary level of security is based on having a large
number of network participants, such that network synchro-
nization (or consensus) alone already limits the TPS. More-
over, most of the permissionless blockchains online are PoW-
based. Therefore, even if a certain level of TPS requirement
is met, it comes at a price of huge consumption and waste of
energy.
Openness can yet be another issue of permissionless
blockchains for a decentralized medical recording applica-
tion. Even though privacy is to some extent provided by
permissionless blockchains in the way of anonymizing trans-
acting parties, many transactions can still be linked, poten-
tially resulting in speculation and/or manipulation of users’
privacy. For example, a user of this type of decentralized
system, e.g., when applied to medical record keeping, may
be identified by her colleagues by comparing the time she is
away from work and timestamps of recent transactions. It is
even worse if malicious parties find a security hole in the
smart contracts of the medical record keeping application,
which may result in horrible privacy breaches.
Unlike the permissionless blockchains, permissioned
blockchains have restrictions on network participation.
Specifically, permissionless blockchains like Bitcoin and
Ethereum allow anyone to read records on blockchains,
to make transactions, or to become a miner, while spe-
52http://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Leased_Proof_of_Stake
53http://slimco.in/
54https://www.burst-coin.org/
55https://nulltx.com/what-is-proof-of-elapsed-time/
56https://www.algorand.com/
cific invitations are needed to participate in a permissioned
blockchain, e.g., HyperLedger Fabric57.
Many users find it difficult to differentiate permissioned
blockchains from permissionless ones due to their similari-
ties:
• Both are decentralized and P2P;
• Both participants share the same copy of append-only
ledger of transactions;
• Both participants synchronize the network through con-
sensus;
• Both try to provide a certain level of the immutability of
the shared ledger, etc.
Further confusion is caused by the evolution of permissioned
blockchains over the past years. In general, permissioned
blockchains can be categorized into two broad types: private
blockchains and consortium blockchains. Private blockchains
have the strictest system participation control. All reading,
transacting, and mining privileges are strictly controlled
within a single organization by the network owner. In com-
parison, consortium blockchains are subtly different from
private blockchains in that the system participation is con-
trolled by a number of organizations that form the consor-
tium.
In the area where permissionless and permissioned
blockchains overlap there are hybrid blockchains. Hybrid
blockchains try to combine the advantages of both per-
missionless and permissioned blockchains, compromising
among security, efficiency, cost, fairness, etc., to meet the
increasingly complex application requirements.
In this section, we explain these different types of
blockchains through examples.
1) Private Blockchains
A private blockchain has access control and operates under
a specific organization. Participants need to be invited, and
existing participants may decide on future entrants. Once
an entity has joined the network, it will play a role in
maintaining the blockchain in a decentralized manner. In
addition, private blockchains rely on internal participants’
honesty to verify transactions, which saves the efforts and
potential wastage of mathematical PoW as the means of
maintaining security. Overall, private blockchains are more
efficient in terms of scalability and compliance.
MultiChain58, as an example of private blockchains,
is a platform that helps organizations to build a pri-
vate blockchain for financial transactions. In traditional
blockchains, access to a private key means the ownership
of the funds. In contrast, beyond using only private keys to
control the funds, MultiChain has developed the “handshak-
ing" process in its whitepaper [41]. The process needs two
participants to first connect, and then verify permission of
each other to enter inter a transaction. After verification, they
send each other a challenge message, which is returned with a
57https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
58https://www.multichain.com/
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TABLE 2: Comparison among Different Blockchains
Parameters Permissionless Private Consortium Hybrid
Network Decentralized Centralized Centralized Hybrid
TPS Low High High High
Visibility & Partici-
pation
Open Restricted Restricted Varies
System Governance Hard Easy Medium Varies
Security Varies High High High
Examples Bitcoin, Ethereum,
EOS
MultiChain Hyberledger Fabric XinFin
signature to prove the ownership of the funds. If an agreement
is not reached, the connection will be aborted.
Furthermore, MultiChain has resolved a notorious
dilemma posed by most private blockchains, i.e., a participant
may monopolize the mining process. The solution lies in
the introduction of a parameter called "mining diversity",
restricting the number of blocks that may be produced by
the same miner within a given time window. If the miner
of a new block is proven to have violated the requirement
of mining diversity, this block will be deemed invalid by the
network. Consequently, the higher the mining diversity is, the
less chance that a miner could monopolize the network.
Overall, MultiChain has the following desirable character-
istics:
• enabling secure mining without expensive PoW consen-
sus that leads to enormous power waste, which mean-
while enhances scalability;
• enabling network administrators to manage privileges of
upcoming participants;
• preventing the network from being monopolized by a
miner by introducing mining diversity such that a miner
cannot over-produce too many blocks within a time
window.
2) Consortium Blockchains
From some people’s perspectives, consortium blockchains
are a subset of private blockchains. Therefore, they are also
called "partially private".Similarly, it features many of the
same benefits as private blockchains, such as high efficiency,
high scalability, and greater transaction privacy than per-
missionless blockchains. However, rather than having an
organization in full control of the blocks, the consortium
blockchain is a blockchain where the consensus process is
controlled by a pre-selected set of nodes; e.g., at least 10
out of 15 organizations in this consortium need to sign and
approve a block for it to be valid. It solves the problem of
private blockchains that they are more vulnerable to being
hacked and information altering in internal networks.
Hyperledger Fabric is an example of consortium
blockchain implementation for distributed ledger solutions.
In Hyperledger Fabric, the consensus consists of 3 phases
implemented by participating nodes from different organiza-
tions:
1) Endorsement: to get at least m out of n participants’
signatures to endorse a transaction.
2) Ordering: accept the endorsed transactions and agree
to the order to be committed to the ledger.
3) Validation: validate the results of ordered transactions
and check endorsement policy and double-spending.
This has implemented a better division of labor, and the
applications may choose different endorsement, ordering,
and validation based on their different needs. In addition,
Fabric has fewer nodes than permissionless blockchains and
computes data massively in parallel, which makes Fabric’s
scalability much greater than the permissionless blockchains.
Indeed, Fabric can scale to over 1000 TPS in a very short
time. Overall, Fabric as an example of consortium blockchain
strengthens its flexibility in security and permission.
3) Hybrid Blockchains
As we discussed above, the consensus of a permissioned
blockchain is controlled by one or several parties, and con-
sensus of a permissionless blockchain is not controlled by
any party but agreed by a majority of the users in the network.
Hybrid blockchains are the combination of these two types.
It can make the transactions private but still verifiable by an
immutable record on the permissionless blocks.
An example of a hybrid blockchain is XinFin59, which
aims to bridge the $5 trillion global infrastructure deficit by
letting institutions and/or governments connect blockchain-
based digital assets to IoT enabled equipment in order to raise
foreign direct investments and enable peer-to-peer financ-
ing. XinFin foundation is a non-profit organization which
liaises with different international governments in order to
reduce the existing gap in global infrastructure. According to
XinFin, the lack of government-sponsored financing hinders
the possibility of many infrastructure projects around the
globe. However, by creating a secured blockchain transaction
platform, XinFin aims to bridge that gap wherein investors
can bid for different infrastructure projects and finance them
59https://www.xinfin.org/
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in a smoother way, thereby avoiding all the issues and paper-
work that arise from finance an infrastructure project across
different countries.
To sum up, Table 2 depicts the different traits, favorable
application scenarios, and examples for the different flavors
of blockchains.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Blockchain systems leverage cryptography technologies, P2P
networking and consensus models to provide infrastructures
for decentralized applications. In this article, we have re-
viewed the history of blockchain systems and clarified their
common definitions. We have presented the application sce-
narios of dApps, which in our opinion is the subject matter
of future blockchains. We have also discussed the desirable
characteristics of dApps and recent directions in blockchain
development, including payment channels, novel consensus
models and non-public blockchains. We believe that net-
worked computing systems are on the edge of a new era of
the decentralized ecosystem, which will eventually lead to
the next-generation Internet services.
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